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INTRODUCTION

Corporate law statutes determine the nature of the relationship between
shareholders, the principal owners of the corporation, and the board of di
'
rectors, those w ho run and operate the corporation. Under the Delaware
*

I would like to thank the Michigan Law Review, particularly the Notes Office for their
endless help. I would also like to thank Professor Laura N. Beny for her many comments and in
sights. Finally, I would like to thank my family for their support and my wonderful wife, Sana, for
her lasting and unwavering love and encouragement.
I.
See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Megasubsidiaries: The Effect of Corporate Structure on
Corporate Control, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1577, 1588 (1971) ("A major function of the corporate stat

utes is to allocate powers between shareholders and management.").
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2
General Corporation Law ("DGCL"), many of the powers are delegated to
the board of directors. More specifically, under section 141, "the business
and affairs of every corporation . . . [are] managed by or under the direction
3
of a board of directors . . . ." The Delaware courts have interpreted this pro
vision

by

deferring

to

decisions

by

directors

and

their

designated

management under the business j udgment rule, which presumes that in mak
ing a business decision, the directors acted on an informed basis with a good
faith, an honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the
4
company. As many have noted, "[t] he effect of this presumption when ap
plied by a court is that the court will not substitute its judgment for that of
the board, unless it is shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the
5
directors' decision involved a breach of fiduciary duty."
Despite the enormous delegation of power from shareholders to direc
tors, shareholders still retain certain essential powers such as the right to
6
7
vote on mergers and to elect directors. Among these is the right to vote on
the sale of all or substantially all of the assets of the corporation. Section

271 of the DGCL provides that:
Every corporation may at any meeting of its board of directors or govern
ing body sell, lease or exchange all or substantially all of its property and

assets

.

.

.

as its board of directors or governing body deems expedient and

for the best interests of the corporation, when and as authorized by a reso
lution adopted by the holders of a majority of the outstanding stock of the

corporation entitled to vote

.

.

. .8

In Gimbel v. The Signal Cos., Chancellor Quillen, writing for the Dela
ware Court of Chancery, articulated the now often-cited Gimbel test, which
considers both the quantitative and qualitative nature of the proposed asset
sale in determining whether an asset sale constituted substantially all of the
9
assets of a corporation. C hancellor Quillen explained that "[i]f the sale is of
assets quantitatively vital to the operation of the corporation and is out of
the ordinary and substantially affects the existence and purpose of the cor
10
poration, then it is beyond the power of the Board of Directors."

2.
DGCL.
3.

For the remainder of this Note,I will abbreviate Delaware General Corporation Law as
DEL. CODEANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2006) (emphasis added).

4. Smith v. Van G orkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985) ("The business judgment rule is
the offspring of the fundamental principle, codified in 8 Del.C. § 141(a), that the business and af
fairs of a Delaware corporation are managed by or under its board of directors.").
5. RODMAN WARD, JR. ET AL., FOLK ON THE DELAWARE G ENERAL CORPORATION LAW
§ 141.2.2.1,at G CL-IV-34 (4th ed. 1999 & Supp. 2006).
6.

Tit. 8, § 251(c).

7.

ld. § 211.l.

8.

Id. § 271(a) (emphasis added).

9.

316A.2d 599 (Del. Ch. 1974).

IO.

Id. at 606 (emphasis added).
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B ecause the Gimbel test is not a mathematical, bright-line test, many of
the issues litigated under section 271 relate to whether a proposed sale of
assets unilaterally undertaken by the board is a sale of "substantially all of
11

the assets" of the corporation and therefore requires a s hareholder vote.

Delaware courts have repeatedly dealt with this issue on a case-by-case ba
12
sis. There is, however, one technical issue the Delaware courts have yet to
completely resolve: whether a sale of substantially all of the assets of a sub
sidiary which constitutes substantially all of the assets of the parent
implicates a parent shareholder vote. Such an issue would arise if a parent
corporation decided to sell its assets, which were placed within a subsidiary.
The proposed assets to be sold, for the purposes of this Note, represent sub
stantially all of the assets of the parent corporation. If the sale is conducted
at the subsidiary level, does the sale only require a shareholder vote by the
parent corporation, the record holder of the subsidiary's shares, or also a
vote by the shareholders of the parent corporation who ultimately are the
'3
beneficiaries of the parent corporation? Put another way, does a section

271 transaction effectuated at the subsidiary level require a shareholder vote
by the shareholders of the parent corporation or only the shareholders of the
subsidiary?
Until recently, the Delaware courts had summarily concluded that the
only vote required was the vote of "the record holder of all of the shares,"
obviating the need to attain shareholder approval from shareholders of a
14
In J.P. Griffin Holding Corp. v. Mediatrics, Inc., the

parent corporation.

Delaware Court of Chancery concluded that because the defendant corpora
tion was the record holder of all of the shares of its subsidiary and voted all
of its shares in favor of the proposed sale, the requirements of section 271
15
were met. By implication, the court refused to construe section 271 to re
quire shareholders of the parent corporation vote on the proposed asset sale.
In the court's view, the section 271 subsidiary asset sale did not require
shareholder approval by the shareholders of the parent corporation. A later
case, Leslie v. Telephonies Office Technologies, Inc., avoided deciding a
similar issue but noted that "more often than not, D elaware courts have up
held the legal significance of corporate form, in a corporate-subsidiary
,, 1 6
comp 1 ex . . . .

11. See, e.g., Oberly v. Kirby, 592 A.2d 445, 464 (Del. 1991); Hollinger Inc. v. Hollinger
Int'!, Inc., 858 A.2d 342 (Del. Ch. 2004); Katz v. Bregman, 431A.2d 1274 (Del. Ch. 1981); Gimbel,
316A.2d 599 (Del. Ch. 1974).
12.

See generally WARD ET AL., supra note 5, § 271.3.

13. Throughout this Note, I will refer to this hypothetical transaction as a "§ 271 subsidiary
asset sale." In addition, I will refer to similar transactions that involved non-Delaware corporations
as "subsidiary asset sale" transactions.
14. J.P. G riffin Holding Corp. v. Mediatrics, Inc.,No. 4056, 1973 Del. Ch. LEXIS 153,at *5
(Jan. 30, 1973).
15.

Id.

16. No. 13045, 1993 Del. Ch. LEXIS 272, at *26--27 (Dec. 30, 1993). The Leslie court did
note, however, the possibility that a vote by shareholders of the parent would be required if the court

1812
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A more recent case, however, cast doubt on this technical statutory in
terpretation

by

the

Delaware

courts.

In

Hollinger Inc.

v.

Hollinger

International, Inc., Vice Chancellor Strine viewed the defendant corpora
tion's argument that the section 271 subsidiary asset sale did not implicate a
11
He cautioned

vote by its shareholders with a healthy amount of skepticism.

against a strict, technical s tatutory construction of section 271, because of
the widespread phenomenon of public companies indirectly holding all of
18
Vice Chancellor S trine worried

their operating assets through subsidiaries.

that such a reading of section 271 "would, as a practical matter, render [sec
tion] 271 an illusory check on unilateral board power at most public
19
Ultimately, he decided to leave the section 271 subsidiary as
20
set sale issue unresolved, but his brief discussion raises concerns and

companies."

leaves open the possibility that a court could enjoin a section 271 subsidiary
asset sale without approval from shareholders at the parent level.
On its face, this section 271 subsidiary asset sale issue may seem a nar
row, technical issue, but its relevance is becoming increasingly important.
As noted by Professor Melvin Eisenberg, "a significant portion of the coun
try's business assets is now held, not only by corporations, but by massive
subsidiary corporations-megasubsidiaries. As a result, ultimate ownership
of business assets is often not only once but twice or more removed from the
21
assets themselves." The growing and widespread practice of corporations
placing their assets under subsidiaries supports the need for resolution of the
section 271 subsidiary asset sale issue discussed in the hypothetical above.
Without certainty on what votes are required to authorize such transactions,
certain corporations are less likely to pursue asset sales through their sub
sidiaries-despite their potentially beneficial, value-creating nature-and
instead sell through the parent. Moreover, when corporations do choose to
effectuate asset sales through their subsidiaries, litigation is likely to arise
between parent shareholders and the parent corporation. These potential
adverse effects could create significant costs that ultimately harm share
holders of corporations in Delaware. As such, determination of which
shareholders are entitled to a vote to authorize a sale of substantially all of
the parent corporation's assets held under a subsidiary is critical. This Note
aims to address and resolve this issue.
concluded that the subsidiary functioned merely as the "instrumentality" of the parent in effecting
the asset transaction. Id. at *24-25.
17.

858 A.2d 342,348 (Del. Ch. 2004).

18.

Id.

19.

Id.

20. Id. (explaining that because " the policy implications of ruling on [defendant corpora
tion]'s technical defense are important, prudence counsels in favor of deferring a necessarily hasty
decision on the interesting question presented.").
2 1. Eisenberg, supra note I, at 1577. Eisenberg argues that this phenomenon of mcgasub
sidiaries threatens shareholder voting rights and as a result, "the right to vote the subsidiary's stock
in these transactions either inheres in the parent and is exercisable by the body of the parent's share
holder, or passes through the parent directly to the parent's shareholders." Id. at 1588-89.
Additionally, with the advent and use of triangular merger structures, assets are more frequently
placed at the subsidiary level. See infra Section II.B for a discussion of triangular mergers.
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This Note argues that a parent shareholder vote is not implicated under
section 27 1 when a parent corporation effectuates a sale of substantially all
of its assets held under a subsidiary. Part I examines a number of different
corporate law legal regimes, including Delaware's, and concludes that with
out clear legislative direction, a parent shareholder vote in the context of the
hypothetical transaction is not necessary and contrary to a number of princi
ples integral to corporate law and its application. Part II then specifically
addresses the non-statutory interpretation aspects of Delaware corporate law
as they relate to this issue. Section II.A reviews the separate corporate exis
tence doctrine and its applicability to this particular issue. The doctrine
strongly supports the conclusion that a shareholder vote at the parent level is
unnecessary. Section 11.B considers other form-over-substance transactions,
such as triangular mergers and de facto mergers, which Delaware courts
have condoned despite their indirect, adverse effects on shareholder rights.
Finally, Section 11.C engages in a brief fiduciary duty analysis establishing
that the fiduciary duties owed by directors to shareholders provide adequate
protection to shareholders in the context of a section 27 1 subsidiary asset
sale. Section Il.C then concludes that a section 27 1 transaction effectuated
by a subsidiary and voted on by the parent corporation and not the parent's
shareholders is entitled to the presumptive protection of the business judg
ment rule.
I. EXAMINING DIFFERENT CORPORATE LAW REGIMES AND
THEIR APPROACHES TO SUBSIDIARY ASSET SALES

In considering the section 27 1 subsidiary asset sale issue, Part I provides
an overview of a number of significant state corporate law regimes and how
their legislatures and courts have resolved this particular issue. In the con
text of this brief analysis, the states that do require a parent shareholder vote
to authorize the sale of substantially all of the parent corporation's assets
held under its subsidiary have done so by following explicit legislative lan
guage provided in the relevant statute. Without clear legislative direction,
courts, such as New York's, have shown reluctance in requiring a parent
shareholder vote.
The discussion in Part I demonstrates an overall consistency between
different corporation law regimes, with courts using strict statutory interpre
tation, focusing on statutory language and plainly interpreting the language.
This approach of strict statutory interpretation promotes definiteness and
certainty in the law, which invariably enables corporations to better plan
based on statutory language. Delaware is no exception to this approach. In
fact, as discussed below, the Delaware courts have clung to the notions of
certainty when interpreting the DGCL. This Part provides support for why
strict statutory interpretation, the general interpretative approach, s hould
also apply to the section 27 1 context.
Section I.A analyzes the canons of interpretation used by Delaware
courts and finds that when a statute's meaning is simple and clear, it should
be interpreted as such. Thereafter, Section LB examines New York corporate

1814
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Jaw, which similar to Delaware corporate law, does not provide for explicit
directives on the subsidiary asset sale issue. Section LC then considers other
corporate law regimes that require a shareholder vote at the parent level be
cause the respective legislatures have drafted explicit statutory language
requiring such a vote. Considering these differing approaches, Part I con
cludes that without explicit direction from its legislature, Delaware courts
must not, through interpretation, create a second requirement of voting at
the parent shareholder level.
A. A Literal and Technical Approach to Statutory Interpretation
The forthcoming analysis in this Section reveals two dominant princi
ples of

statutory

interpretation

in Delaware.

First and foremost,

the

Delaware Supreme Court has repeatedly provided that if statutory language
is plain and simple, it should be interpreted as such. Second, if the language
invites interpretation from a court, the court should interpret the statute with
the objective of effectuating legislative intent. This can be done by consider
ing both legislative history

and preliminary statements made by the

Delaware Legislature.
The plain meaning of the words of section 27 1 of the DGCL should pre
vail and not require a parent shareholder vote. The pertinent words relating
to this issue of section 27 1 subsidiary asset sales are "when and as author
ized by a resolution adopted by the holders of a major ity of the outstanding
22
stock of the corporation entitled to vote thereon." The phrase "the holders
of a majority of the outstanding stock" could mean the actual holder of the
subsidiary's stock, the parent corporation, or the ultimate beneficiaries, the
shareholders of the parent corporation. Answering this question ultimately
depends on the approach of statutory interpretation taken by a court. B y
canons o f interpretation used by Delaware courts, the words o f a statute
should be followed when a statute's meaning is simple and clear.
The Delaware courts' general approach to statutory interpretation is to
23
In the context of

accord statutory language its plain meaning, if possible.

interpreting the Medical Malpractice Act under Delaware, the Supreme
Court of Delaware in Sostre v. S wift emphasized that "[i]t is well settled that
'[s]tatutory language, where possible, should be accorded its plain meaning.'
Moreover, when a statute is clear and unambiguous there is no need for
24
statutory interpretation.'' Hence, if a statute's language is unequivocal, a
court should interpret the statute according to its plain and simple meaning.
This approach essentially ensures the enactment and implementation of leg
islative directives provided in the statutory provisions.

22.

DEL CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 271(a) (2006) (emphasis added).

23.

Sostre v. Swift, 603 A.2d 809, 813 (Del. 1992).

24. Id. (citations omitted). Although the case did not implicate corporate law, a Court of
Chancery court cited Sostre to support the conclusion that "[w]hen the language of the statute is
clear and unambiguous there is no need for statutory interpretation." In re Home Shopping Network,
Inc. S'holders Litig., No. 12956, 1993 Del. Ch. LEXIS 80, at *35-36 (May 19, 1993).

1815
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Sostre is not an outlier case and is consistent, in fact, with the Supreme
Court of Delaware's repeated insistence on the importance of interpreting
statutory language, where possible, to accord the language its plain mean
ing. For example, in State of Delaware v. Lillard, the Court dealt with an
employment

related

issue.

It

explained,

like

the

Sostre

court,

that

"[s]tatutory language, where possible, should be accorded its plain mean
25
ing."
The Court also noted that when a Delaware court is forced to
interpret a statute, it should interpret the relevant statute "so as to give effect
26
to the intent of the legislature." This approach implies that when the legis
lative intent is not patently obvious because of the plain nature and
simplicity of the statutory language, a court should strive to incorporate the
legislative intent behind a provision. Courts can determine this intent by
examining legislative history and preliminary statements made by the legis
27
lature.
Similarly, in Silverbrook Cemetery Co. v. Department of F inance of New

Castle County, the Court refused to infuse statutory interpretation or con
struction.

The Court held that "(b]ecause [section]

1 05

[the relevant

provision] is clear and unambiguous, there is no room for statutory interpre
28
tation or construction." Further, the Court chided the lower court by
explaining that it "erred by engaging in an interpretation of [section] 1 05"
when such an exercise of interpretation was unnecessary and contravened
the legislative intent demonstrated in the clarity of the provision's lan
29
guage. Synthesizing this body of case law reveals two dominant principles
of statutory interpretation in Delaware. First, if statutory language is plain
and simple, the Delaware Supreme Court will interpret it such. Second, if
the language requires interpretation, the court should interpret the statute
with the objective of effectuating legislative intent, considering both legisla
tive history and preliminary statements made by the Delaware Legislature.
The mandate of interpreting statutes in a simple and literal fashion when
the statutory language is plain and clear is heightened in the context of in
30
terpreting corporate law. In Speiser v. Baker, Chancellor Allen explained
this edict: "[t]he utility of a literal approach to statutory construction is par
ticularly

apparent

in

the

interpretation

of

the

requirements

of

our

corporation law [Delaware General Corporation Law]-where both the
statute itself and most transactions governed by it are carefully planned and
25.

531A.2d 6 13,617 (Del. 1987).

26. Id. In directing Delaware courts to consider the intent of the legislature in interpreting a
statute, the Court noted that "[l]egislative history and preliminary statements, such as the preamble,
can often aid in statutory construction." Id.
27.

Id.

28.

Silverbrook Cemetery Co. v. Dep't of Fin., 449 A.2d 241, 242 (Del. 1982).

29.

See id.

30. See Stephen J. Massey, Chancellor Allen 's Jurisprudence and the Theory of Corporate
Law, 17 DEL J. CORP. L. 683, 708-09 (1992) (discussing Chancellor Allen's approach to interpret
ing Delaware corporate law). The author notes that Chancellor Allen has expressed "his belief that
the purpose of modem state corporation law statutes-i.e., 'the facilitation of corporation formation
and operation' -is best served by a literal interpretation of the terms of such statutes." Id. at 708.
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result from a

thoughtful

and

highly
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31
rational process."
Corporations

(through their board of directors and advisors) take great efforts to structure
their transactions in accordance with the relevant law, hoping to reduce the
likelihood of future disputes and litigation. They look to corporate law for
guidance. Therefore, when statutory language appears to be clear and plain,
corporations will act accordingly. A court conjuring up an unreasonable and
32
non-literal interpretation will disrupt the planning of corporations, thus
raising transaction costs. Ultimately, these higher transaction costs are trans
ferred to shareholders.
Chancellor Allen's loyalty to literal interpretation is not without compel
ling rationale. As he notes, a court should interpret statutory language with
"a sensitivity to the importance of the predictability of that law. That sensi
tivity causes [Delaware] law, in that setting, to reflect an enhanced respect
33
for the literal statutory language." An "enhanced respect" for literal inter
pretation better promotes predictability and certainty, which allows for
34
corporations to better plan and act.
Having established this framework,
Chancellor Allen explained what a literal interpretation entails. He stated
that a court, when considering the meaning of plain and simple statutory
language, should accord the language its "usual and customary meaning to
35
persons familiar with this particular body of law." Hence, the words "enti
tled to vote," which were at issue in the case, should mean what those
36

familiar with the DGCL expect them to mean.

In supporting Chancellor Allen's approach, Professor Stephen Massey
argues that two features of corporate law and practice require literal inter
37
pretation by the courts. First, as discussed above, corporate transactions are
most often the result of careful, thoughtful planning by sophisticated par
38
ties.
Therefore, if the parties intended to avoid the literal statutory
meanings, they would contract accordingly. Second, "if the knowledgeable
and experienced drafters of the [DGCL] had intended [a provision] to be
construed in some way other than the literal [meaning], they would have
39
used language that explicitly accomplished that objective." Hence, the pri-

31.

525A.2d 1001, 1008 (Del.Ch. 1987) (ernphasis added).

32. Massey, supra note 30, at 708 (quoting William T. Allen, Competing Conceptions of the
Corporation in American Law, Address at Rocco J. Tresolini Lecture in Law, Lehigh University 2
(Oct. 29, 1990) (noting that corporation law's purpose is "the facilitation of corporation formation
and operation" (emphasis added))).
33.

Speiser, 525A.2d at 1008.

34.

See id.

35.

Id.

36. See id. In this particular case, Chancellor Allen ultimately rejected the literal argument
posited by the plaintiff. He noted that a related phrase to "entitled to vote" implicated in § 160 of the
DGCL was not "a technically precise term whose literal meaning is clear," thus "requir[ing] inter
pretation." Id.
37.

Massey, supra note 30, at 709.

38.

Id.

39.

Id.
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mary onus of providing corporate law directives on statutory interpretation
matters is on the Delaware Legislature, rather than the courts. In addition,
literal interpretation placates corporate law's need for certainty, which helps
40

to drive the objective of predictability in the law.

The approach of literal interpretation applies to much of Delaware's
corporate law. For example, as demonstrated in a later opinion by Chancel
lor Chandler, literal interpretation extends to section 203. The statutory
matter at issue was whether a partial tender offer is a "business combina
41
tion," thus implicating section 203. Prior to delving into what a "business
combination" entailed, the Chancellor stated that "[o]f greatest importance
in statutory interpretation is the plain language of the statute itself. When the
language of the statute is clear and unambiguous there is no need for statu
42
Because the definition of "business combination"

tory interpretation."

under section 203(c) did not include partial tender offers, Chancellor Chan
dler ultimately concluded that a partial tender offer did not fall under the
43
scope of "business combination."
The Court of Chancery of Delaware has generally evoked the principles
of literal statutory interpretation to an even greater extent than the Supreme
Court of Delaware. In the context of a section 27 1 subsidiary asset sale
transaction, the critical question is who are "the holders of a majority of the
,44
outstanding stock of the corporation entitled to vote thereon?'
The lan
guage, on its face, is plain and clear. The corporation that is selling its assets
is the appropriate, constituent corporation. It is the entity that has engaged in
the transaction and must seek approval from its shareholders. A logical ex
tension of this determination is that the

shareholders of the selling
45
Approval by the majority

corporation are the "holders" under section 27 1 .

of the shareholders of the parent corporation is not needed, because their
corporation, the parent corporation, has not engaged in an asset sale and
46
they are not the record holders of shares in the subsidiary corporation.
Thus, a l iteral interpretation leads a rational reader of section 27 1 to con
clude that a section 27 1 subsidiary asset sale transaction does not implicate
a shareholder vote at the parent level. Concluding otherwise would reject the

40. Id. Also, see infra Section LC and accompanying footnotes for a discussion on the im
portance of certainty in corporate law, and more specifically Delaware corporate law.
41. In re Home Shopping Network, Inc. S'holders Litig., No. 12956, 1993 Del. Ch. LEXIS
80 (May 19, 1993).
42.

Id. at *35 (emphasis added).

43. Id. at *36-38. The Chancellor engaged in a lengthy discussion and considered legislative
history because parts of § 203 were not clear and unambiguous on their face. Id. at *40.
44.

DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 271(a) (2006).

45. See id. As discussed above in the Introduction, in J.P. Griffin Holding Corp. v. Medi
atrics, Inc. , the Court of Chancery held that the only vote required was the vote of "the record
holder of all of the shares" of the selling subsidiary corporation. No. 4056, 1973 Del. Ch. LEXIS
153, at *5 (Jan. 30, 1973). Because the defendant corporation was the record holder of all of the
shares of its subsidiary and voted all of its shares in favor of the proposed sale, the requirements of
§ 271 were met. Id.
46.

Rather, the parent corporation is the record holder of the subsidiary's shares.

1818
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"enhanced respect" for literal interpretation that Chancellor Allen encour
aged, which would reduce the significant objectives of predictability and
47

certainty in corporate law.

Even if one assumes that the language of section 27 1 is unclear, the little
48
available legislative history buttresses the conclusion that a shareholder
vote by the shareholders of the parent corporation is not required under sec
tion 27 1 . The enactment of section 27 1

was meant to add additional

flexibility in the procedure for a corporation to sell or otherwise dispose of
49
its assets. Prior to this, the common law provided that neither the directors
nor shareholders could sell the corporation's assets if a single shareholder
50
objected. Interpreting an additional voting layer, despite the clear and un
ambiguous language, would undermine the flexibility section 27 1 was
meant to provide. Moreover, a 1969 amendment indicates the Legislature's
51
intent to restrict voting approval to those "entitled to vote thereon." Prior to
the amendment, section 27 1 required a vote by those "having voting
52
power." In many ways, the words "voting power" are broader and less pre
cise than those "entitled to vote." A shareholder of the parent corporation
may have voting power, in the sense that its voting may indirectly affect
matters at the subsidiary level. Shareholders of the parent, however, are not
entitled to vote because they are not holders of the subsidiary's stock. The
amendment, though not completely dispositive, indicates that the Delaware
Legislature intended to confine the shareholder vote to those "entitled to
vote"-those entitled to vote are the holders of the majority of outstanding
stock of the selling subsidiary corporation, not the shareholders of the parent
corporation.
The exercise of statutory interpretation is often difficult and subject to
53
This shortcoming, however, does not com

the manipulation of a court.

pletely undermine the validity of considering how a provision should be
interpreted. As discussed above, Delaware, and in particular the Delaware
Court of Chancery, prefers a literal statutory interpretation approach that
affords the language of a provision, where possible, its plain and simple
meaning. Vice Chancellor Strine warned that such an interpretation in the
context of megasubsidiary and conglomerate corporations may render sec-

47.

See Speiser v. Baker, 525 A.2d 1001,1008 (Del. Ch. 1987).

48. Unfortunately, legislative history in Delaware is not methodically compiled. Treatises
provide some brief legislative history. This Note will consider these scant pieces of information in
supporting its conclusions.
49.

WARD ET AL., supra note 5,§ 271.1.

50.

Id.

51. 2 R. FRANKLIN BALOTTI & JESSE A. FINKELSTEIN, THE DELAWARE LAW OF CORPORA
TIONS & BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 271, at X-2-X-3 (3rd ed. 1998 & Supp. 2006).
52.

Id. at X-3.

53. Kenneth W. Starr, Observations About the Use of Legislative History, 1987 DUKE L.J.
371, 376 ("The most compelling and widely discussed concern about the use of legislative history is
its potential for manipulation. It is often said that one generally finds in the legislative history only
that for which one is looking.").
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Although this

warning is helpful, the burden of addressing this concern should be placed
on the Delaware Legislature. Delaware, as the largest and preeminent corpo
rate law state, has an active legislature that aims to resolve corporate law
55
issues as they arise. Therefore, the legislature, not judges, should amend
section 27 1 to address this concern of disenfranchising shareholders, if nec
essary. In fact, the legislature has refrained from amending section 27 1 ,
despite the existence of J.P. Griffin Holding Corp. v. Mediatrics, Inc., in
which the court held that the "holders" under section 27 1 were the parent
56
corporation, which held all of the shares of the subsidiary. In essence, the
Delaware Legislature by remaining dormant on this issue may have assented
to the holding of the J.P Griffin court and deemed the result appropriate. As
such, when a court reviews a section 27 1 subsidiary asset sale, it should re
quire a shareholder vote only by the shareholders of the subsidiary, normally
the parent corporation.
B . Without Explicit Uinguage, Requiring a Vote by Parent Shareholders
ls Contrary to Corporate La,w Objectives
New York courts have held that a subsidiary asset sale under New York's
corporate law does not require a parent shareholder vote. Although the hold
ings of other state courts are not binding in Delaware, they often provide
some guidance on certain issues that are either of first impression or unre
solved. For example, in J.P. Griffin Holding Corp. v. Mediatrics, Inc., the
Court of Chancery of Delaware, in concluding that only the record holder of
all shares of the subsidiary selling the assets was required to vote, cited a
New York state court decision that previously dealt with the subsidiary asset
5
sale issue. 7
Under New York law, the analogous provision to section 27 1 is section
909 of the New York Business Corporation Law, which provides that a "sale,
lease, exchange or other disposition of all or substantially all of the assets of
a corporation . . . shall be authorized . . . [when, among other required pro
cedures] the shareholders shall approve such sale, lease, exchange or other
disposition . . . by vote at a meeting of shareholders . . . of two-thirds of all

54. Hollinger Inc. v. Hollinger Int'l, Inc., 858 A.2d 342, 348 (Del. Ch. 2004). Although the
concern is legitimate, it is not novel and is implicated in other areas, as well. As discussed in Section
11.B, corporations often effectuate mergers through subsidiaries via a triangular merger structure to
obviate the need for shareholder approval of the parent shareholders. See infra Section 11.B. Despite
this effect, the courts have condoned this form of transaction and have refrained from interpreting
§ 251, the relevant merger statute, in a way to require a vote by the shareholders of the parent corpo
ration, whose subsidiary is merging. Hollinger, 858 A.2d at 348.
55. See Wells M. Engledow, Handicapping the Corporate Law Race, 28 lowA J. CORP. L.
143, 161 (2002).
56.

No. 4056,1973 Del. Ch. LEXIS 153, at *5 (Jan. 30, 1973).

57. Id. (citing Cross Props., Inc. v. Brook Realty Co., 322 N.Y.S.2d 773 (App. Div. 1971)
(limiting the vote of shareholders to the record holders of the shares)).
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In Cross Properties, Inc. v.

Brook Realty Co., the S upreme Court, Appellate Division, of New York was
called upon to interpret this section of the statute in attempting to determine
"whether under New York law a sale of all or substantially all the assets of a
New York corporation, which is essentially the wholly owned subsidiary of
a twice or thrice removed foreign corporation, must be approved by the ul
timate beneficial owners, that is, two thirds of the shareholders of the
59
ultimate parent corporation." Similar to Vice Chancellor Strine's recogni
6()
tion of corporations placing their assets under subsidiaries, the New York
court noted the trend of "conglomerate corporate enterprises and so-called
megasubsidiaries," which undoubtedly results in some dilution of share
61
holder voting power. This dilution of shareholder power, however, did not
compel the court to read into the statutory language of section 909 to require
a shareholder vote by the ultimate beneficiary owners, the shareholders of
62
the parent corporation.
The court, rather, chose to interpret the word
"shareholders" in section 909 under its plain language by concluding that
"'shareholders' referred to in paragraph (3) [of section 909] are the 'share
holder[s] of record' " and not the shareholders of the parent corporation of
63
the subsidiary selling the assets. In following this strict interpretation, the
court deferred to the New York Legislature and placed the burden on the
legislature to make any sort of requirement of a parent shareholder vote ex
64

plicit.

The Cross Properties, Inc. court's choice not to expand the voting re
quirement of section 909 to include a vote by shareholders of the parent
corporation is justified not only on statutory interpretation grounds, as dis
cussed above, but also on the basis of promoting certainty and definiteness
in corporate transactions. In defending its holding, the court explained the
potential consequences of holding otherwise: "Such a construction would
jeopardize the definiteness required for the orderly transaction of corporate
affairs and would substantially impair the marketability of [the assets] held
by corporate subsidiaries by making the necessity for approval a complex

58. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 909 (McKinney 2003). Unlike § 271 of the DGCL. § 909 re
quires a two-thirds vote of all outstanding shares. Section 271 only requires an affirmative vote by
the majority of all outstanding shares. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 271(a) (2006).
59.

Cross Props., Inc., 322 N.Y.S.2d at 779.

60.

Hollinger Inc. v. Hollinger Int'I., Inc., 858 A.2d 342, 348 (Del. Ch. 2004).

6 1. 322 N.Y.S.2d at 780 (recognizing "that utilization of pyramiding corporations often
results in the dilution or denial of many shareholder prerogatives").
62. Id. Interestingly enough, the court explicitly stated in its opinion that the trend of devel
oping corporate conglomerates and holding companies adversely affects shareholder rights and
prerogatives. Despite this noted consequence, the court refrained from infusing judicial paternal
protection to shareholders.
63.

Id.

64. Id. The court emphasized that megasubsidiaries and alike existed before § 909 was
amended by the New York Legislature in 1962. Despite this existence, the Legislature chose not to
amend § 909 to require a vote by parent shareholders in a subsidiary asset sale scenario. Id. One can
construe not amending § 909 as a form of legislative assent. See id.
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65
question of fact." In other words, the importance of certainty and definite
ness in corporate matters, in this case, trumped the consideration of dilution
66
Had the court interpreted the statute other

of shareholder voting power.

wise, the methodology of corporate statutory law interpretation would lose
certainty. With lesser certainty on the voting issue, subsidiaries would have
67
greater difficulty in effectuating asset sales. Such difficulty would likely
impede certain value-creating sales, which would ultimately hurt sharehold
68
ers by not maximizing shareholder value.
The policy consideration of promoting definiteness in corporate matters
through predictable statutory interpretation has similar applicability under
Delaware law. Like the New York statute, section 27 1 's language, if inter
preted plainly, does not require a vote by shareholders of a parent
corporation. Without explicit direction from the Delaware Legislature,
Delaware courts should be reluctant to infuse an additional layer of share
holder voting. Muddying the interpretation of section 27 1 will reduce the
69
certainty of Delaware corporate law interpretation. With less certainty, cor
porations and their boards of directors will naturally act overly cautious and
spend valuable resources in attempting to transact in an environment of less
07
•

certamty.

C . Explicit Statutory Language Allows for a Parent Shareholder Vote While
Still Fostering an Environment of Certainty and Definiteness
Unlike New York law, New Jersey law and the Model Business Corpora
tion Act both provide explicit language that shareholder approval in the
context of a subsidiary asset sale constitutes a vote by the shareholders of a

65.

Id. at 780 (emphasis added).

Later in the opinion, the court did note that fiduciary duties may provide shareholders
with adequate protections. Id. at 781 ("A sale thus known to be opposed by the majority of the
shareholders of the parent (although approved by the directors of the subsidiaries) might constitute a
breach of fiduciary obligation")). Later in this Note, I discuss how the duties of loyalty and care
under Delaware law provide adequate assurances that the parent corporation and its directors will
not act against the interests of shareholders in effectuating § 271 subsidiary asset sales. See infra
Section 11.C.

66.

67. See Elliott J. Weiss & Lawrence J. W hite, Of Econometrics and Indeterminacy: A Study
of Investors' Reactions to "Changes" in Corporate Law, 75 CAL. L. REv. 551, 569 (1987) (stating

generally that "the law's certainty and predictability will reduce transaction costs and facilitate
consummation of mergers that presumably benefit the corporation and its shareholders").

68.

See id.

See infra Section LC where I anchor the policy considerations of certainty and definite
ness in Delaware case law. Because Delaware is the state where many corporations incorporate, the
Delaware courts have placed great emphasis on interpreting laws in a method that promotes cer
tainty, which better enables corporations to plan and transact accordingly.

69.

70. One could argue that granting directors discretion over § 271 subsidiary asset sales in
creases agency costs and may encourage directors to strip the corporation of its assets, which could
destroy shareholder value and ultimately result in a higher cost of capital in the public markets. Such
an argument, however, fails to consider the fiduciary duties imposed on directors by Delaware law,
namely the duty of loyalty and the duty of care. See infra Section 11.C for a discussion on how these
duties provide adequate protection to shareholders.
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parent corporation. Section l 4A: 1 0-1 1 of the New Jersey Corporation Act is
the sale of assets provision and requires a shareholder vote approving the
11
sale of all or substantially all of a corporation's assets. The statute further
states that "[t]he sale, lease, exchange, or other disposition of all, or substan
tially all, the assets of one or more subsidiaries of a corporation . . . shall be
treated as a disposition within the meaning of subsection 1 4A:1 0- l l ( l) if
the subsidiary or subsidiaries constitute all, or substantially all, the assets of
2
the corporation." 7 The inclusion of this additional subsection in section
1 4A: 1 0- l l ensures that if a wholly owned subsidiary comprises all or sub
stantially all of the assets of a parent corporation, the sale by the subsidiary
3
of its assets is treated as a sale by the parent. 7 In essence, the New Jersey
statute explicitly eliminates the separate corporate existence of a parent's
subsidiary in the context of a subsidiary asset sale. In terms of shareholder
approval, a sale by a subsidiary of the parent is like a sale by the parent.
The New Jersey approach of viewing a subsidiary asset sale as an asset
sale by the parent corporation aligns with the language provided in the
Model Business Corporation Act. Section 1 2. 02(h) of the Act states that
" [t]he assets of a direct or indirect consolidated subsidiary shall be deemed
the assets of the parent corporation for the purposes of this section [section
4
1 2, which is the section for disposition of assets]" 7 Again, the approach is to
treat the subsidiary and the parent as one entity thus requiring a vote by the
shareholders of the parent corporation. This approach ensures that share
holders are entitled to vote on the sale of substantially all of the assets of
their corporation, whether placed under a subsidiary or not.
The dangers and concerns of interpreting the statute to provide addi
tional shareholder protections do not exist, because the New Jersey statute
and the Model Business Corporation Act are both explicit in their estab
lishment of a vote by shareholders of the parent corporation. This explicit
direction maintains certainty and definiteness in interpretation while still
57
requiring a parent shareholder vote.
Despite the fact that the New Jersey/Model Business Corporation Act
and New York approaches reach different results, they both ensure certainty
and definiteness, which is likely to encourage and facilitate corporate trans
6
actions. 7 This certainty will likely reduce the transaction costs of
subsidiaries selling their assets, thereby increasing the value gained by sub
sidiaries in exchange for the assets they sell.
In considering this comparative analysis, section 27 1 of the DGCL most
resembles New York's section 909 in that both statutes do not provide for

71.

N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:IO-l I (West 2003).

72.

Id.

73.

JOHN R. MACKAY II, NEW JERSEY BUSINESS CORPORATIONS AND 0rHER BUSINESS

ENTITIES § 9-5 (3d. ed. 2005).

74.

MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 12.02(h) (2002).

75.

See infra notes 32-34 and accompanying text.

76.

See Weiss & White, supra note 67.
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treatment of a subsidiary asset sale as a sale by the parent. Following the
New York interpretation ensures that Delaware courts refrain from creating
additional voting requirements that are not explicitly provided for in the
s tatutory language. Moreover, interpreting "holders of a majority of the out
standing stock" to mean the record holders of the shares of the selling entity,
which in the case of a subsidiary asset sale would be the subsidiary, pro
motes greater certainty

in

the Delaware corporate law regime. This

enhanced value ultimately inures to the benefit of the shareholders of the
77
parent corporation.
•

The relevance and influence of policy considerations of "certainty" and
"definiteness" under Delaware law are not limited to the discussions and
8
articles of academics. 7 Rather, the Delaware courts have mentioned the im
portance of such considerations in determining the outcome of cases. For
example, in Stroud v. Grace, the Supreme Court of Delaware considered the
scope of the duty of disclosure by the board of directors in connection with
9
proposed charter amendments. 7 In reviewing the trial court's extension of
the duty of disclosure, the court emphasized that "[i]t is important that there
80
This consideration of certainty drove

be certainty in the corporation law."

the court to conclude that the board had no duty to disclose beyond the re
81
Certainty in

quirements provided on the face of the relevant statute.

interpreting the relevant DGCL statute compelled the court to dismiss the
82

plaintiffs' arguments against the defendant board of directors.

Certainty in interpreting corporate law provides more bright-line tests,
which creates a more conducive and efficient transactional environment for
corporations. Corporations are more likely to transact, and more specifically
in this context, sell and buy assets when they know with greater certainty the
required approvals that must be attained. Furthermore, with greater cer
tainty, the chances of litigation are substantially reduced,

thus saving

corporations significant money in litigation costs. The more efficient trans
actional market and reduced litigation costs all ultimately lead to greater
83
shareholder value.
Establishing that certainty is an important consideration reinforces this
Note's central argument that a board of directors authorizing a section 27 1
subsidiary

77.

asset

sale

need

not attain shareholder

approval

from

the

Id.

78. For a few examples, see Isaac Ehrlich & Richard
Legal Rulemaking, 3 J. LEGAL Srno. 257 (1974); Werner Z.
and Complexity, 21 UCLA L. REv. 1233 ( 1974); and Louis
Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557 (1992).
79.

606 A.2d 75 (Del. 1992).

80.

Id.

8 1.

Id.

82.

Id.

at

A. Posner,

An Economic Analysis of
Reducing Law's Uncertainty
Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An
Hirsch,

87 (emphasis added).

83. Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in Securities
Class Actions, 43 STAN . L. REV. 497, 572 (explaining that litigation costs, such as settlement pay
ments, ultimately lead to "destruction of shareholder value").
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shareholders of the parent corporation. Section 27 1 's language on its face
only requires a vote by the "the holders of a majority of the outstanding
48
stock." Since the shareholders of the parent corporation are not the holders
of the stock of the selling corporation, the subsidiary, their vote is not
needed. Ruling otherwise would promote uncertainty in legal interpretation,
which, as established above, is contrary to the edicts of the Delaware courts.
In the event the Delaware legislature deems a vote at the parent shareholder
level

necessary, amending section 27 1 to adopt explicit legislative
58
requiring a vote by shareholders of the parent corporation is the

language

best course of action in that it protects shareholder interests while not
sacrificing certainty in the DGCL.
II. CONSIDERING SUBSIDIARY ASSET SALES UNDER DELAWARE LAW
This Part determines that Delaware's statutory framework doctrinally
supports a shareholder vote only by the record shareholders of a subsidiary.
Specifically, Section II.A considers the doctrine of separate corporate exis
tence, which generally treats a corporation as a separate legal entity
independent of its shareholders, subsidiaries, and other constituencies.
Thereafter, Section 11.B catalogues a number of form-over-substance trans
actions that Delaware courts have repeatedly condoned, despite their
consequence, whether intended or not, of infringing on shareholder rights.
This analysis helps to rebut arguments mandating a parent shareholder vote
in the context of a section 27 1 subsidiary asset sale in order to better protect
shareholder rights. Finally, Section 11.C engages in a brief fiduciary duty
analysis that supports the conclusion that traditional fiduciary duties provide
ample protection for shareholders in the context of section 27 1 subsidiary
asset sale transactions.
A. Upholding the Doctrine of Separate Corporate Existence
As a general matter under Delaware law, a corporation is treated as an
independent legal entity with a separate existence from its shareholders,
68
management, and subsidiaries . Consequently, a parent corporation is sepa
rate from its subsidiary corporation, and therefore, parent shareholders do
not have voting rights as they relate to actions conducted by the subsidiary.
Addressing this issue is critically important, because in essence, disregard
ing the corporate existence could provide parent shareholders with a claim
that a section 27 1 subsidiary asset sale transaction mandates a vote by
shareholders of the parent corporation. Such an argument would ignore the
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8. § 27 l (a) (2006).

84.

85. Explicit legislative language should be similar to the language adopted by New Jersey,
the Model Business Corporation Act, and other states. See supra Section LC.
86. DAVID A. DREXLER ET AL., DELAWARE CORPORATION LAW AND PRACTICE § 8.02 (2004)
("Historically, Delaware courts have been meticulous in their recognition of the concept of separate
corporate existence; there are only a handful of reported cases in which the 'corporate veil' has been
'pierced.' ).
"
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repeated efforts of Delaware courts to recognize and uphold the separate
legal existence of corporations. s7
H istorically, Delaware courts have repeatedly and meticulously recog
ss
For example, in In re

nized the concept of separate corporate existence.

Sunstates Corp. Shareholder Litigation, the Court of Chancery of Delaware
89
considered the plaintiffs' agency and veil piercing argument. It concluded
that "[f]or the purposes of the corporation law, the act of one corporation is
not regarded as the act of another merely because the first corporation is a
subsidiary of the other, or because the two may be treated as part of a single
9()
economic enterprise for some other purpose." The court then limited the
91
disregard of separate existence to circumstances of sham and fraud.
The Supreme Court of Delaware expressed a s imilar sentiment about the
92
It held that a court may only d isregard separate corporate existence

issue.

"in the interest of justice, when such matters as fraud, contravention of law
or contract, public wrong, or where equitable consideration among members
93
of the corporation require[s] it." Importantly, the circumstances meriting
disregard did not include the effectuation of a legitimate section 27 1 sub
sidiary asset sale. Fraud and public policy are compell ing exceptions to
respecting the corporate form of entities, but without indication of fraud,
courts should continue to preserve the separate existence of corporate enti
ties. Broadening the exceptions to encompass garden-variety asset sales held
at the subsidiary level ignores the Delaware courts' overwhelming trend of
upholding the separate existence of corporate entities while exaggerating the
intended scope of cases like Leslie. Moreover, the Delaware courts have
demonstrated that "disenfranchisement" of shareholders in the context of a
triangular merger is not necessarily a d ispositive reason to disregard corpo
94

rate existence.

Expanding the circumstances that justify the piercing of the corporate
veil and disregard of separate corporate entities has significant policy impli
cations. The notion of treating a corporation as an independent legal entity,
one separate from its shareholders, officers, and subsidiaries, is critical and
95
Without separate corporate

corollary to the concept of limited liability.

existence, limited liability and its many benefits are threatened. Among
other things, limited liability facilitates the development of and investment

87.

Id.

88.

Id.

89.

788 A.2d 530 (Del. Ch. 2001).

90.

Id. at 534.

91.

Id.

92.

Pauley Petroleum,Inc. v. Cont'! Oil Co.,239 A.2d 629 (Del. 1968).

93.

Id. at 633.

94.

See infra Section 11.B (discussing triangular mergers).

95. Robert B. Thompson, Piercing the Corporate Veil: An Empirical Study, 76 CORNELL L.
REV. 1036, 1039 (1991).
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96

Additionally,

without separate corporate existence, certain benefits of shareholders, who
are also employees of a corporation, may be reduced, because courts and
other governmental entities may then view corporations and their sharehold
9
as one. 7 For example, a shareholder-employee's claim for

ers

unemployment benefits may be threatened if the corporation was disre
garded and the shareholder-employee was considered a self-employed
98
individuai. The importance of these policy considerations requires that dis
regard only occur with clear legislative intent, such as the case in New
99
Jersey. Therefore, a court should cautiously consider disregarding the sepa
rate existence of corporate entities, especially when fraud and sham
circumstances are absent.
Courts, however, have disregarded the separate existence of a corpora
tion in certain limited circumstances. For example, in Leslie v. Telephonies
Office Technologies, Inc., shareholders of the parent corporation argued for
disregarding the separate existence of the parent corporation and subsidiary
because they alleged the subsidiary was the alter ego of the parent corpora
100
As explained in
tion, thereby requiring a vote by parent shareholders.
Leslie, Delaware courts have long recognized the:
independent legal existence of corporate entities . . . . There are certain ex
ceptions to this rule, however. The use of the corporate form to perpetuate
a fraud has always constituted such an exception. Furthermore, when
courts determine that a corporation is, in substance, the mere alter ago, or

96.

Id.

at 1 040 (explaining that "[w]ithout limited liability, the risk each investor would face

in investing in an enterprise would tum in part on the wealth of other investors. Such a system
would have search costs and other costs which would likely lead investors to make a few larger
investments where risk-assessment information was accessible, and perhaps entail a reduced level of
economic activity across the entire economy."). In the article, the author cites to a number of articles
that support the conclusion that limited liability is critical to the public capital markets, including
Paul Halpern et al.,

An Economic Analysis ofLimited Liability in Corporation Law, 30 U. TORONTO
G. Manne, Our Two Corporation Systems: Law and Economics, 53 VA L.

L.J. 1 1 7 ( 1980) and Henry
REV. 259 ( 1 967).
97.

See Thompson, supra note

95, at 1 04 1 . Professor Thompson cites two specific cases that

provide examples of the danger of disregarding separate legal existence. He first cites to

v. Califano,

Markarian

473 F. Supp. 671 (W.D.N.Y. 1 979), in which the court held that the Social Security

Administration could not pierce the veil of a close corporation to decrease a claimant's eligibility for
benefits on the grounds that earnings were to be considered as coming from a sole proprietorship.
Thompson,

supra note

95, at 1 04 1 n.30. By preserving the separate existence, the claimant, who was

a shareholder/employee, was able to claim Social Security benefits. Reaching a different result, in

Roccograndi v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review,

1 78 A.2d 786 (Pa. Super.

Ct. 1 962), the court

concluded that the holding shareholder/employees were self-employed and, therefore, ineligible for
unemployment benefits. Thompson,

supra

note 95, at 1041 n.3 1 . In this case, the decision by the

court ultimately punished shareholders. Analyzing these two cases in conjunction helps to establish
the risk, from the shareholder perspective, of regularly disregarding the separate existence of corpo
rations, their shareholders, and their subsidiaries.
98.

Thompson,

99.

N.J.

100.

supra note

95, at 104 1.

STAT. ANN. § 14A: l0-l l (2003).

No. 1 3045, 1993 Del. Ch. LEXIS 272, at *26-27 (Dec. 30, 1993).
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instrumentality of its owners, they will in certain instances, deny legal ef
101
fect to the otherwise valid creation of a corporate entity.

The Leslie court ultimately denied the motion to dismiss the claim to
disregard by explaining that the actions of the parent and subsidiary corpo
rations could justify disregarding their separate existence and treating the
parent and subsidiary as a single legal entity under the common control of
.
I 02
the parent corporation.
Leslie potentially implicates broad issues by opening the door to disre
garding the separate legal existence of corporations, specifically between
parent and subsidiary corporations. The following considerations help to
limit Leslie to its facts and reassure the preservation of the independent legal
existence doctrine. First, the hesitancy of the court's language is quite ap
parent. The court inserted a number of critical qualifiers to its statement that
an instrumentality claim is a viable exception to the recognition of inde
pendent corporate existence. The court first took great effort to explain that
"courts have generally recognized the independent legal existence of corpo
io3
Furthermore, even in an instance where "a corporation is, in

rate entities."

substance, the mere alter ego, or instrumentality of its owners, [courts] will
104
The court then concluded its

in certain instances, deny legal effect . . . ."

discussion on when to disregard the separate corporate existence by empha
sizing that "more often than not, Delaware courts have upheld the legal
105
significance of corporate form, in a corporate-subsidiary complex."
Al
though

one

could

deem

the

court's

construction

of

the

alter

ego/instrumentality exception as potentially expansive, these many limita
tions

and qualifiers help

to

limit the broad read of the

language.

Additionally, the court's language as dicta, and not a holding, does not pos
sess the same precedential strength as earlier cases do, which limit the
disregard of separate corporate existence to the circumstances of fraud or
1 06
evasion of a judicial decree.
A second reason to refrain from broadening the implications of Leslie is
that it involved a potential oppression of minority shareholders and was not
a typical instrumentality case. The court noted that plaintiffs alleged that the

101.

Id.

at *26-27 (citing Walsh v. Hotel Corp. of Am., 23 1 A.2d 458, 461 (Del. 1953), i n

which the Delaware Supreme Court refused to "decide the general proposition a s to when a Dela
ware law court may disregard the corporate structure"). Interestingly, the "alter ego/instrumentality"
exception is a more recent development and supported mostly by dicta in Delaware. DREXLER ET
AL.,

supro note 86.
102.

See Leslie,

103.

Id.

at *26.

1 04.

Id.

(emphasis added).

105.

Id.

at *26-27 (emphasis added).

1 06.

E.g., Pauley Petroleum, Inc. v. Cont'! Oil Co., 23 1 A.2d 450, 452-53 (Del. Ch. 1 967)

1993 Del. Ch. LEXIS 272 (Dec. 30, 1 993).

("In the absence of fraud, the separate entity of a corporation is to be recognized. This principle has
been enunciated by all of the courts of this state." (quoting Shaffer v. Standard Brands Inc., 1 7 8
A.2d 3 1 1 , 3 1 6 (Del. Ch. 1 962),

aff'd,

1 87 A.2d 78 (Del. 1 962))). The

lished and therefore does not carry much precedential weight.
* l.

Leslie,

Leslie

opinion is also unpub

1 993 Del. Ch. LEXIS 727, at
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defendant shareholders used their control over the parent corporation to con
trol the subsidiary to help "siphon off assets to themselves [the defendant
107
shareholders], at a cost to shareholders."
This action, the plaintiffs
claimed, led to the distribution of proceeds to the defendant shareholders to
108
the exclusion of minority shareholders.
Oppression of minority sharehold
ers is out of the ordinary and compels a restriction on the reading of Leslie
as it relates to the doctrine of independent corporate existence, primarily
because the driving force in Leslie was thwarting oppression of minority
shareholders and not reshaping the doctrine of independent corporate exis
tence. The facts also are dissimilar to the circumstances of a typical section
27 1 subsidiary asset sale transaction, where the subsidiary sells its assets but
10')
In a customary section 27 1 sub

does nothing to siphon off the proceeds.

sidiary asset sale, the Leslie facts are inapplicable and therefore applying the
court's dicta directive would be inappropriate.
In practice, the Delaware courts have chosen to follow the approach of
In re Sunstates Corp. Shareholder Litigation by limiting the circumstances
of corporate veil piercing. An empirical study found that as a practical mat
ter, Delaware courts rarely disregard the separate existence of Delaware
1 10
corporations and their constituencies by piercing the corporate veil,
par
111
ticularly in the context of a public corporation.
This practice, though not
inconsistent with the arguments provided in Leslie, aligns with the past his
torical stance that protects the separate existence of corporate entities, unless
1 12
evidence of fraud and/or sham intentions is evident.
B . Fann-over-Substance Transactions: Two Illustrative Examples
A possible argument against the central thesis of this Note is that not re
quiring a shareholder vote by the shareholders of the parent corporation, the
ultimate beneficiaries and "true" shareholders, favors form over substance,
which allows directors of Delaware corporations to engage in asset sales
without shareholder approval. In response to this argument, it is most impor
113
tant to highlight that Delaware law often favors form over substance. This
107.

Leslie, 1993 Del. Ch. LEXIS 272, at *27-28.

108.

Id. at *28.

109. Leslie is also distinguishable on the basis that it involved interested direc
tors/shareholders. Id. at *27-28. Because of the existence of a conflict of interests, a court would
normally ignore the business judgment rule presumption and more diligently scrutinize the decision
of the directors to sell the company's assets. In contrast, in a typical disinterested § 271 subsidiary
asset sale transaction, a court would review the directors, decision to sell the assets under the busi
ness judgment rule presumption. See infra Section Il.C.
110. Thompson, supra note 95, at 1052-53. Furthermore, "a piercing decision is not less but
more likely when the shareholder behind the veil is an individual rather than another corporation."
Id. at 1038 (emphasis added). In our context, we are dealing with a corporation, the parent corpora
tion, and not an individual, so piercing is less likely.
111.

Id. at 1039.

112.

See Pauley Petroleum Inc. v. Cont'! Oil Co., 239A.2d 629 (Del. 1968).

113. Discussing whether normatively a form-over-substance approach is best is not within the
scope ofthis Note. Such a discussion requires a separate extensive analysis.
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Section dissects two such examples helping to reaffirm that a form-over
substance approach in the section 27 1 subsidiary asset sale context is not
unusual, but rather a norm established by Delaware precedent.
Delaware's form-over-substance bias is most apparent in the context of
triangular mergers. Under section 25 1 of the DGCL, two corporations may
merge into one surviving corporation with the approval of shareholders of
1 14
Assuming an ordinary stock-for-stock

the two "constituent" corporations.

merger structure, the shareholders of both the acquiring corporation and the
I I5
A relatively recent struc

target corporation must approve the transaction.

ture, called a triangular merger, allows for the acquiring corporation to
eliminate the requirement of attaining its shareholder approval. B y using a
wholly owned subsidiary as the acquiring entity, the "constituent" corpora
tion becomes the subsidiary and not the parent; therefore, the vote to
authorize the transaction is required from the shareholders of the subsidiary,
which is the parent corporation, and not the shareholders of the parent cor1 16
porat1on.
•

The indirect effect of using a triangular merger structure is that the
shareholders of the parent corporation, the ultimate acquirer, "do not have
1 17
the right to vote on the merger nor are they entitled to appraisal rights"
since the parent corporation is not a constituent corporation under section
1 18
Both the structure and effect of triangular mergers are analogous

25 1 (c).

to those of section 27 1 subsidiary asset sale transactions. Delaware courts
have, as indicated below, repeatedly upheld the triangular merger structure,
despite the effects it has had on the rights of parent shareholders. One
prominent case in which this structure arose and was upheld is Paramount
Communications, Inc.

v.

Time Inc., where the Delaware Supreme Court dealt

primarily with the issue of whether the defensive mechanisms adopted by
Time to protect its friendly merger with Warner were in accordance with the
1 19
Unocal standard. The Court noted that the reverse triangular merger struc
120
ture under "Delaware law did not require any vote by Time shareholders."

1 1 4.

DEL CODE ANN. tit. 8,

§ 25 1 (c) (2006). The merger must also involve an increase of at

least 20 percent of the surviving corporation's shares to implicate a vote.
1 1 5.

Id.

Id.

1 1 6.

SAMUEL C. THOMPSON, JR., BUSINESS PLANNING FOR MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 1 9495 (2d ed. 2001 ) (quoting R. FRANKLIN BALOTTI & JESSE A. FINKELSTEIN, THE DELAWARE LAW OF
CORPORATIONS & BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS §§ 9.5, 9.7 ( 1988)).
1 1 7.

Id.

Generally, under

§ 262, dissenting shareholders of a constituent corporation are af§ 262.

forded appraisal rights as a remedy to a merger. Tit. 8 ,
1 1 8.

Tit. 8,

1 1 9.

5 7 1 A.2d 1 140 (Del. 1 989).

§ 251 (c).

1 20.

Id.

at 1 146 (emphasis added). Interestingly enough, prior to a hostile bid by Paramount to

acquire Time, the board of Time had structured the merger as a stock merger, thus implicating a vote
under New York Stock Exchange rules.

See id.

Upon the issuance of the hostile bid, the Time board

restructured the transaction as a cash deal to avoid the New York Stock Exchange voting require
ment and ensure that shareholders did not possess veto power on the proposed Time-Warner deal
through their exercise of voting.

See id.

Despite this, Chancellor Allen held that the Time board did

not breach its fiduciary duties. Edward

Work?, 44 UCLA L.

B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Law

REv. 1009, 1 1 74 n. 1 82 ( 1 997).
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In fact, these structures are commonly accepted under Delaware law and
there is no mention of oppression of shareholder rights.
Why oppression of shareholder rights would dominate the determination
of section 27 1 subsidiary asset sale and not a triangular merger is difficult to
explain or justify. In both structures, the parent corporation effectuates a
transaction using a subsidiary, which has the effect of denying the parent
shareholders of voting rights (and in the case of a triangular merger, ap
praisal rights, too). Upholding triangular mergers while disallowing section
27 1 subsidiary asset sales without approval by parent shareholders is seem
ingly inconsistent. As Delaware's treatment of triangular mergers illustrates,
in the absence of fiduciary duty violations, Delaware upholds the form of a
transaction despite the substantive adverse effects on certain shareholders'
rights. Therefore, a section 27 1 subsidiary asset sale should not require
shareholder approval at the parent corporation level, absent legislative action
to the contrary.
A second example of where the Delaware courts have elevated form over
substance, despite the adverse effects on shareholders, is the de facto merger
doctrine. In Hariton v. Arco Electronics, Inc., the Supreme Court of Dela
ware dealt with the issue of whether a proposed section 27 1 asset sale
followed by a mandatory plan of dissolution and distribution was in fact a
12
de facto merger that implicated appraisal rights under section 262. 1 In the
case, the defendant corporation agreed to an asset sale under section 27 1 in
122
As part of this asset sale,

exchange for stock in the acquiring corporation.

the defendant corporation agreed to call a shareholder meeting to approve a
voluntary liquidation and dissolution, whereby the shares of the acquiring
corporation would be distributed to the shareholders of the defendant corpo
123
ration.
In effect, the plaintiff argued that this set of transactions, the asset
sale and liquidation, accomplished the same result as a merger of the defen
1 24

dant corporation into the acquiring corporation.

Despite the substance of the transaction, the court denied appraisal
rights. The court recognized that the "[p]laintiff's contention that this sale
125
has achieved the same result as a merger is plainly correct. "
Most signifi
cantly, the structure had the effect of denying dissenting shareholders their
126
appraisal rights.
Despite this recognition, the Court held that "the reor
ganization here accomplished through [section] 27 1 and a mandatory plan
121
of dissolution and distribution is legal." The Court justified its position by

121.

188A.2d 123 (Del. 1963).

122.

Id. at 124.

123.

Id.

1 24.

Id.

125.

Id. at 125 (emphasis added).

126. There are no appraisal rights for dissenting shareholders in a § 271 transaction. DEL
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262 (2006).
1 27. Hariton, 188 A.2d at 125 ("[The holding of the case] is so because the sale-of-assets
statute and the merger statute are independent of each other. They are, so to speak, of equal dignity,
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explaining that the board of the defendant corporation was free to choose
among the different transaction structures available, and so long as the tech
nical requirements of that structure were met, the Court must respect the
12s
form.
The consequence of denying shareholders their appraisal rights under
this "de facto merger" transaction did not compel the Court to grant share
holders appraisal rights. In fact, the Court concluded by noting that its
129
conclusion "is not an anomalous result in our corporation law."
If the form
of a transaction is properly followed under Delaware law, the courts will
generally avoid disrupting it regardless of the adverse effects on sharehold
ers.
Both the Hariton and Paramount cases are illustrative examples of how
Delaware courts often elevate form over substance. If a board of directors
appropriately follows the relevant Delaware form, be it a triangular merger
or an asset sale followed by dissolution, a Delaware court is likely uphold
the transaction, despite its adverse effects on shareholders. Similarly, a court
should uphold a section 27 1 subsidiary asset sale that is effectuated only by
a vote of the shareholders of the subsidiary, the parent corporation, so long
as the form requirements are met and there is no violation of fiduciary du
ties.
C. Fiduciary Duties: Protection fo r Shareholders of Parent
Co rporations Engaging in Subsidiary Asset Sales
Allowing for a section 27 1 subsidiary asset sale transaction to proceed
without a vote by the shareholders of the parent corporation may seem prob
lematic to many because of its disenfranchising effect on shareholders.
Section 27 1 was meant to protect shareholders from a corporation unilater
ally deciding to sell all or substantially all of its assets, thus changing the
substance and purpose of the corporation. Although this consideration does
not prevail in the section 27 1 subsidiary asset sale context, fiduciary obliga
tions provide shareholders adequate protection from the actions of the board
of directors in this context.
As provided by the Delaware courts, directors owe shareholders fiduciary
131
130
In Smith v. Van Go rkom,

duties: the duty of loyalty and the duty of care.

the Delaware Supreme Court explained that directors owe shareholders these
duties. The duty of care, among other things, includes a duty to be informed,
"prior to making a business decision, of all material information reasonably

and the framers of a reorganization plan may resort to either type of corporate mechanics to achieve
the desired end. This is not an anomalous result in our corporation law.").
128.

See id.

129.

Id.

130. WARD ET AL., supra note 5, § 141. The case law discussing fiduciary duties is extensive.
This Note only engages in a brief analysis of these duties as they relate to a § 271 subsidiary asset
sale transaction.
131.

488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
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A duty of loyalty "embodies not only an affirmative

duty to protect the interests of the corporation, but also an obligation to re
frain from conduct which would injure the corporation and its stockholders
133
Generally, the more significant

or deprive them of profit or advantage."

the subject matter of the decision, the greater is the requirement on directors
to probe and consider alternatives, in essence, to "perfect" their fiduciary
1 34
duties.
Fiduciary duties similarly protect shareholders in subsidiary asset sales.
In a section 27 1 subsidiary asset sale transaction, the directors of the parent
corporation owe the standard fiduciary duties toward their shareholders. As
135
such, shareholders are protected from decisions based on gross negligence
136
and/or self-dealing.
In the ordinary course, a court will apply the business
judgment rule presumption that the directors acted honestly and in good
. 37
faith with respect to the section 27 1 subsidiary asset sale transaction .
The
business judgment rule confers upon the directors a relatively broad amount
138
This discretion, how

of discretion in selling the assets of the corporation.

ever, will be denied if a court determines that the directors violated any of
. 39
their fiduciary duties to shareholders .
Therefore, a director's grossly and
uninformed vote to authorize a subsidiary asset sale would be overturned.
Additionally, a court would reverse a subsidiary asset sale that somehow
violated the duty of loyalty or, at a minimum, provide shareholders suffi
cient monetary damages.
Ultimately, the shareholders of a parent corporation engaging in a sec
tion 27 1 subsidiary asset sale are provided adequate protection through the
fiduciary duties of care and loyalty. These two fiduciary duties provide base
line protection for shareholders against actions by the board of directors.
This protection helps to alleviate any concerns, as noted by Vice Chancellor

Strine, 140 that shareholders are at the mercy of directors if the courts allowed

132. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984). Put another way, "the duty of care
requires a director, when making a business decision, to proceed with a 'critical eye' by acting in an
informed and deliberate manner respecting the corporate merits of an issue before the board." Ivan
hoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334, 1345 (Del. 1987).
133. Ivanhoe Panners, 535 A.2d at 1345. "Most basically, the duty of loyalty proscribes a
fiduciary from any means of misappropriation of assets entrusted to his management and supervi
sion." WARD ET AL., supra note 5, § 141.2.1.1.
134.

See WARD ET AL., supra note 5, § 141.

135. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 873 (providing that "the concept of gross negligence is also the
proper standard for determining whether a business judgment reached by a board of directors was an
informed one").
136.

Id. at 872.

137. Gimbel v. Signal Cos., 3 16 A.2d 599, 609 (Del. Ch. 1974) (providing that "[t]his pre
sumption, an important aspect of what has generally come to be known as the 'business judgment
rule,' has been consistently reaffirmed and broadened with respect to the sale of corporate assets
over the past several decades," and citing a number of Delaware decisions supporting this conclu
sion).
138.

Id.

139.

Id.

140.

See Hollinger Inc. v. Hollinger Int'I, Inc., 858 A.2d 342, 348 (Del. Ch. 2004).
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section 27 1 subsidiary asset sales to proceed without a vote by shareholders
of the parent corporation. Moreover, holding that a section 27 1 subsidiary
asset sale does not need approval by parent shareholders preserves the struc
ture of Delaware corporate law. As in other contexts, Delaware corporate
law defers to the sound business judgment of directors, who are more so
phisticated and possess greater expertise than judges; at the same time, the
standard fiduciary duties of loyalty and care provide adequate safeguards to
protect shareholders in the event directors violate their duties toward share
holders. Therefore, arguments of shareholder oppression in the context of a
section 27 1 subsidiary asset sale are as unconvincing as the argument that
shareholders, in a hypothetical situation, should have a remedy against di
rectors for making an informed, good faith business decision to expand
operations internationally that ultimately failed.
CONCLUSION

Many academics and commentators will argue that allowing section 27 1
subsidiary asset sales to proceed without approval by the shareholders of the
parent corporation will only contribute to Delaware's continual "race to the
141
bottom." This critique, however, fails to consider the practical implications
of creating an additional voting layer at the parent shareholder level. As
demonstrated in this Note, Delaware aims to promote predictability and cer
tainty in its law, particularly in the context of its method of interpreting
corporate law. This predictability and certainty fosters a more conducive
transactional environment that allows corporations to efficiently and effec
tively transact. Disrupting this environment should only be done as a last
resort or explicitly by the Delaware Legislature. Section 27 1 allows for a
corporation to sell all or substantially all of its assets so long as it attains
shareholder approval. Logically, a subsidiary selling its assets under section
27 1 need only attain approval from its shareholders, the parent corporation.
Holding otherwise threatens the edicts of the Delaware corporate law and
disturbs the conducive transactional nature of Delaware corporate law.

141. See Daniel R. Fischel, The "Race to the Bottom " Revisited: Reflections on Recent De
velopments in Delaware 's Corporation law, 76 Nw. U. L. REV. 913, 915 (1982) (arguing that recent
"decisions, although containing much rhetoric about protection of shareholders, will actually oper
ate to reduce shareholders' welfare" (emphasis omitted)).
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